

UTAH CITIZENS' ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEMILITARIZATION DESERET CHEMICAL DEPOT

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2001 - 6:30 P.M.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BUILDING

MINUTES

Members Present:

BAUER, Dan	Tooele County
BENNETT, John	SAC
DOWNS, Dennis	DEQ/DSHW
HOLT, Rosemary	Women Concerned
HULLINGER, Sid	Tooele County
KIM, Deborah	U of U
OSTLER, David	SAC
SILCOX, Dr. Geoff	U of U
WHITE, Beverly	Tooele County
WHITE, Gene	Tooele County Commission
WINTERS, Suzanne	State Science Advisor

Guests Present:

AMES, Deborah	EG&G
BITTNER, Chris	DEQ
BUCHANAN, RW	EG&G
COOPER, Col.	DCD
CALDWELL, Monte	PMCD-TOCDF
GAYLON, Ray	DCD
GRENIER, Roger	TOCD
GROENWALD, Jason	FAIR

HENDRICKS, Jim	PMCD-TOCDF
JACKSON, David	Citizen
JONES, Donald H.	CAMDS
KURKJY, Tom	EG&G
LE MONS, Kerry	EG&G
MC CLATCHEY, Sean	EG&G
MESESAN, Mark	EG&G
MIHLFULT, Max	EG&G
NG, Deborah	DEQ
OLIVER, Harold	DCD
OWENS, Douglas	Parsons Behle & Latimer
OSTLER, Sharon	Citizen
PAISLEY, Barbara	DCD
SAGERS, Kari	Tooele Co Emergency Mgmt
SAUPE, Mike	SUC
SNELL, Dick	EG&G
WALTERS, Clara	GOPB
WARBY, Clint	Tooele Outreach

WELCOME/MINUTES - Dr. Suzanne Winters

Suzanne Winters, Chair of the Citizens' Advisory Commission, called the meeting to order and welcomed all those in attendance. She asked for corrections to the minutes and corrections were submitted. Afterwards, a motion was made by David Ostler to accept the minutes, Jeff Silcox seconded and the motion carried.

TUTORIAL

TOCDF CHANGEOVER PROCESS - Buck Buchanan

(Attachment 1)

Buck Buchanan, Changeover Coordinator for EG&G and TOCDF, updated the CAC on the changeover process. (Attachment I)

OVERVIEW

The TOCDF Agent campaigns to be conducted at TOCDF, sequenced in order of conduct.

- QRA Risk Assessment found GB munitions should be processed first. They are nearing completion.
- VX rockets were found to be the next highest threat so they were moved ahead of mustard. The VX campaign will begin sometime in the Spring.

Variations Between GB and VX Processing.

- The majority of munitions to be processed and those stored on Deseret Chemical Depot are the same. There are two different munitions: Spray tanks and VX land mines.
- Decontamination for the two agents are different. Sodium Hydroxide is used to decontaminate GB and Sodium Hypo-chloride for the VX. Sodium Hydroxide is not effective against VX, however, Sodium Hypo-chloride may be used for either VX or GB agent.

The priority during the changeover and the campaign is to ensure the safety of the workforce, the public, and the environment.

PLANNING

During the planning process the types of munitions were categorized by energetic and non-energetic munitions.

Energetic Munitions

- The rockets and 155mm projectiles have energetics or explosives in them and those are the same munitions processed during the GB campaign.

- The land mines have an explosive component, but they are limited to VX and have not been processed in the past.

Non-energetic Munitions

- The ton containers have GB in them and thousands have been done.
- The spray tanks are new for VX.

Processing systems are similar during the GB campaign. A mine handling system will be installed and the spray tanks will require a software change in the bulk drain system.

MULTI-AGENT MONITORING

By using multi-agent monitoring during the VX process, it will allow processing of both GB secondary waste and the start of VX munitions while they clean up the facility. It also allows them not to change the carbon filters in the heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems which promotes waste minimizations.

MONITORING/LABORATORY

ACAMS

There are key elements to storing munitions and processing. There are significant activities that have to be completed and demonstrate proficiency in the VX operation before the VX campaign can begin.

To support multi-agent monitoring, ACAM monitors will be increased from 108 to 130 and of the 130 monitors, 23 will be GB monitors.

Studies

Studies must be performed to demonstrate the precision and accuracy of the laboratory operations in detecting VX agent and base line studies to demonstrate long-term consistent performance of monitoring equipment over a 30 day period.

Procedures

Lab and monitoring procedures had to be revised to account for any information as a result of VX, such as; differences in procedures and processes they will use during VX operations. The internal review is completed and was sent to DSHW for final approval.

DECONTAMINATION

There are areas and equipment that must be decontaminated to move from GB to VX. The Rocket Shear Machine and Explosive Containment Room-B will be the first step and when the last components are finished the chemical decon will begin. Most of the current decontamination is now involved with explosives.

The Decon Agent Collection System will be done as parts become available. They will isolate from one processing system to the agent collection system and decontaminate or replace as required. This allows for faster progress with the decon.

Decontamination and preventive maintenance of 1 Munition Demil Machine will be done after the GB Energetic Projectiles are completed in Explosive Containment Room-A.

The Projectile Mortar Demil, Deactivation Furnace and 2 Munition Demil Machines will be done after all the GB Reject Projectiles are completed.

ENVIRONMENTAL/PERMIT MODIFICATIONS

Agent Trial Burns

The liquid incinerators, Deactivation Furnace System and the Metal Parts Furnace have to be approved by the DSHW before VX processing can begin.

SDS Tank Liners

The stainless steel SDS tanks must have liners so they can hold the Sodium Hypochlorite, because stainless steel does not hold up well with Sodium Hypochlorite.

Agent Monitoring Plan

This addresses the multi-agent monitoring concept and how it will be done. It is currently in internal review at TCOF and then will go to DSHW for final approval.

Modifications To Support Spray Tank & Mine Processing

Before beginning VX processing, but during the campaign, modifications must be made to support the spray tank and mine processing operations.

SUMMARY

EG&G is nearing completion of the GB campaign. It is expected to be completed in a January/February time frame. There are a number of similar munitions of both the GB and VX campaigns and the key element is EG&G will not have to redo or refit the machines to process similar projectile munitions.

Multi-agent monitoring provides safety and environmental waste minimization benefits. EG&G plans to sequence the decontamination to support the changeover efforts and minimize the processing down-time, to the least amount possible.

Approval of the permit modifications are required to initiate the VX processing.

PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT - Jim Hendricks

The changeover from GB to VX is one of the major changes in the plant's process. EG&G plans public involvement sessions and public participation in the process. Some of the things planned are:

- Public Availability Sessions in Tooele and Salt Lake City
- Support at the Permit Modification Meetings, with briefings to the local, state and federal officials.
- Putting together fact sheets, press releases, and media tours

Suggestions to get public involvement are welcomed.

Questions

Question: Is Hypochlorite used as an oxidizing agent in solid state missiles?

Answer: Hypochlorite is essentially bleach or Clorox. It is not used in GB rockets due to the harshness to the metals and facilities.

Question: How do you decontaminate the different facilities? Is it with a Sodium Hydroxide solution?

Answer: Sodium Hydroxide will be used for the majority of the decontamination process. Primarily it is sprayed and then a broom or brush is used to scrub the surfaces.

Question: Will the Sodium Hypochlorite be disposed in the same way as the current decon solution is?

Answer: EG&G has approval to ship the spent decon, but not the Sodium Hydroxide for GB and Sodium Hypochlorite. Both will go through the liquid incinerators as before until they have gone through the approval process.

Question: In multi-agent monitoring, are you using separate ACAMs tubes for each agent or is it possible within the same tube and when put through a GC is there any interference between the two agents?

Answer: Two systems are mixed together. The ACAMs detects it and the tube is where the sample is collected and analyzed. Separate ACAMs will monitor for GB and VX. They are close in the analysis and a significant amount of work must be done to separate the two peaks and as VX is not really monitored, rather an analog of GB is what is monitored. VX is broken down and turns into a GB analog and is collected that way. It has a different peak than GB agent

Question: Did JACADS do multi-agent monitoring simultaneously or stop one completely before moving forward?

Answer: One was stopped completely, but because they are enclosures, they are monitoring for all 3 agents: mustard, GB and VX.

Question: Without technical problems?

Answer: We have not heard of any through the PL process.

Question: What provisions are there to prevent terrorists from braking into the stockpile?

Answer: That will be addressed by Col. Cooper.

Question: Are you planning to do the carbon change out anyway or will it have to tie back into the multi-agent process?

Answer: The permit requires a change out when going from one agent to another. The plan is to not do the changeout. There will be GB and VX monitors in the mid-vents, between the filter banks and the filters in the event of a break through. If there would be a break through of GB before the change over finished, that system would be changed out. It is not planned to change all 9 systems out, because of the huge amount of charcoal generated, 55 tons.

Question: What is the GB secondary waste that will be incinerated during the changeover?

Answer: As we start the VX operations, we will be still doing decontamination for GB and cleaning up parts of the building that won't be used for the initial VX process. This will leave a metals parts furnace available. If the approval process for permit modification comes through, we will look at processing VX agent and GB secondary waste. There are metal parts that are currently being processed through the metal parts furnace, however plastic materials and plastic pipe are being stockpiled. We plan to develop a performance test plan to process that material through FDF, similar to JACAD's performance test, submit it to the State for their approval and then begin testing on the stack as part of that process.

Question: Is the Sodium Hydroxide currently being used as a decon solution being shipped off site?

Answer: Not yet, but has been approved for shipment. The state is making final provisions for the permit.

- Question:* You mentioned you would consider using the Sodium Hypochlorite and burning that in the wick also? And is the chlorine a problem in terms of capture?
- Answer:* We don't believe it is a concern, however during the VX trail burn, we will have HCL trained on the stack to verify the system is removing the HCL.
- Question:* For monitoring of the stack are you planning to use the multi-agent ACAMs?
- Answer:* We are not using multi-agent ACAMs. We will have GB ACAMs and VX ACAMs and they will be operating at the same time.
- Question:* Are there any plans to test that in the stack?
- Answer:* It is being tested now. That's part of our precision accuracy studies and baselines.
- Question:* Can you give a description of how you are testing that?
- Answer:* That is covered in the monitoring department's area and I am unable to address question.

Suzanne said she would put Jason's question on the agenda for the next meeting.

OPERATIONS STATUS - Colonel Cooper (Attachment 2)

Colonel Cooper could not go into specifics about what security has been implemented. He assured the Commission the Army is ready at Deseret Chemical Depot. He said they have been raised to "Force Protection Condition Charlie"(FPCON Charlie), the highest level they can go. Some of the processes implemented are:

- Restricted vehicles on Post. The amount of traffic has been reduced.
- Increased security guard manning.
- Reducing the amount of chemical agent being shipped to TOCDF and the minimum number of munitions; only enough to keep them going.
- Temporarily curtailed CAMDS operations because of security issues.
- The amount of operations being done in area 10 have been reduced to the minimum for safety.
- Temporarily halted public tours to ensure the safety of the workforce.

The full weight of the United States Army is behind protecting the Chemical Depot sites. They have proved it to Colonel Cooper's satisfaction, over the past 12 days.

LEAKER INFORMATION

Leakers are up dramatically from last year and are competing with 1999. There have been 2 mustard ton leaks. One was from the plug end and the other from valve safety cap of the ton container. The first one leaked at the plug area, leaked 9 lbs of liquid and reached the ground. That was cleaned up and the soil was put in barrels and placed in igloos waiting for destruction. The second leaker's liquid did not reach the ground.

There were 4 GB over-packed 155MM projectile leakers which leaked vapor. The mustard was not a surprise because of the heat of the desert and this is the time they are expected. They were double overpacked. Nineteen overpacks have failed this year to date.

Two H155 Projectiles leaked about 3 cups of liquid from the nose closure. They were over-packed into M16 containers

The 106 ONC's contain M155 Projectiles had low level vapor readings, out of 601 delivered. We are seeing air born leakage within the ONC. It is suspected that it is either coming through the fault working up the burster well and through the threads or it's leaking into the burster well and coming out the same route. So far, all of those were non-energetic rounds. They had listing plugs with no explosives in them. They have been tested in the igloos before moving and no chemical agent leakage has been detected. When they are moved the agent leaks.

Question: Do you have a no fly zone in mind?

Answer: Yes there is one. I cannot give you specific height and width, but there is one in place.

Question: Will it stay in place?

Answer: It will stay in place for an indefinite future.

Question: Can you describe the benefits and risks involved in the public tours? And is it something that will be indefinite?

Answer: No, it will not be indefinite. It's a benefit to have the public come and see what they are doing. Nine days ago we went to the highest level of security we go to and we have not practiced it very often. I don't think we will ever come off the security measures we have in Charlie. I think the Army will keep those in place. I have to work through the mechanism to get the tours in as quickly and efficiently as possible and still maintain those security measures that have been imposed on the me.

Question: Do you have a high level of people that constantly want to tour the facility? You have been in operation 5 years and I wonder if that has been satisfied by now?

Answer: We have public tours every other Thursday and generally they are filled. We have school groups come in. We usually have 3 to 5 people on the tours.

Question: Is there a real benefit for the cost of this? Is it just for public relations?

Answer: It's for whoever wants to come and visit the facility. That's what we've had in the past and we encourage people to do that.

Question: I know, but you have had 5 years. Perhaps is that sufficient? That's my question, because of the risk.

Answer: That's the Army's decision. We will take that question back to the Army and evaluate that question. I think that's what you want.

Question: Re-evaluation would be something that would be a good idea. I don't know how the rest of the Commission feels, but that is my feeling.

Suzanne asked for comments on re-evaluating public tours.

Question: Rosemary, are you saying re-evaluating not letting them come again or not letting them come while this is happening.

Answer: If the risk is high under these circumstances, I think we have had 5 years of people going through and if you talk about school children, I have always questioned the merit of that anyway. If you only have 3, 4 or 5 people coming through twice a week, isn't that enough?

Comment: Children do not come through, we are talking about college students. The age limit is 18.

Dennis D. Is Rosemary talking about risk to the visitors or to the facility by allowing visitors to come onto the sight? Either way, I've been out to that facility a lot and I don't see that there is a risk. We have our people out there every day and I have been through public tours and official tours and frankly if there are those people that want to go see the facility, as long as the Army determines there isn't a risk to the facility, I don't see a reason to curtail visits.

Suzanne: It's a valid point worth looking at. I know that an item on many people minds is security during the Olympics and the possibility that your facility would be a target for terrorists during the Olympics, do you anticipate anything in addition to your highest level of alert? I know you are working with members of the Olympic Committee. Can you give us any information on the status of plans, before, during and after the Olympics?

Answer: We have been planning for that eventuality and we have measures that we will take to be extra vigilant. We also have options to bring resources in from outside. There is no plan to deploy those resources right now, however, we will train with those resources.

Dave O.: I have toured the plant two or three times. I see the reason why you should not operate tours at the present time. Ultimately you will have to have that available because of the risk of working behind closed doors. Questions of military secrecy have plagued us for years and years, but if we appear open and if someone want to see it, they can. That's democracy.

Question: Will you be doing tours during the Olympics?

Answer: I can't answer that right now, but I suspect that we would be.

FOLLOW UP ITEMS:

BRIEFING TO THE UTAH CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COMMISSION - Tom Kurkijy (Attachment 3)

July 16 Incident Investigation

We were still in the process of having our investigation at the last meeting. The cause has now been determined and corrective action has been taken to prevent it.

- There was an entry into our toxic maintenance area, level B entry. The entrants were working on probing TAP gear in bags with an ACAMs probe, for the purpose of determining its status prior to deconning it or shipping it to area 10 for storage. The entrants exited the TMA in accordance with procedure. Everyone exited the air lock after monitoring to lessen the limit of Quantification (LOQ) and entered the observation corridor. After entering the observation corridor, the TAP gear was removed, bagged, and the entrants left the area. Shortly thereafter the ACAMs in the observation corridor alarmed at 0.40 TWA and the site was masked. The ACAMs cleared after a cycle and the DAAMs tubes confirmed the agent.

Cause

- The cause of the incident was failure to remove the TAP gear in the airlock that had been exposed to low levels of agent. Even though the entrants monitored clean after passing through the airlock, this was the cause.

Corrective Actions

- The corrective actions are to require all entrants to be point-source monitored for other than DPE entries in the A air lock, if working in an agent environment with greater than 1.0 TWA readings.

If the reading is greater than or equal to a 0.20 TWA in the airlock, the TAP gear will be removed in the airlock, bagged, and the entrants will egress. The TAP gear is now kept under engineering control. It's bagged and taken to the TMA for monitoring. Those actions have been implemented.

Question: If this occurs, will people coming out remain masked until they go through the door?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Are you concerned that the alarms in the airlock will not pick up in the area?

Answer: We are concerned they may have egressed too quickly through the air lock. They did not stop and get monitored in the A air lock, they went directly to the B air lock. We decided to slow down that egress process to ensure we don't have the potential for agent in the Category C area, agent observation corridor.

Question: How long after the clothes are removed before the ACAMs alarm?

Answer: Twenty-two minutes. The entrants went to the clinic and were assessed by the medical staff and found there was no agent exposure or symptoms of agent exposure. Because the level was less than 0.10 TWA, no blood was drawn.

WETEYE BOMB BRIEFING - Gaylon Ray

(Attachment 4)

The MK 116 bomb is a Navy munition specifically designed for bulk chemical agent and holds approximately 350 pounds of GB (43 gallons). The bomb body has a thin aluminum alloy wall, 1/8 inch thick, weighs 75 pounds, is 86 inches long, with an outside diameter of 14 inches. With the hardware attached the filled bomb weighs 524 pounds. The weapon's stability is achieved by four-folded, spring-loaded fins, which are extended upon release from the aircraft. The interior of the bomb is divided into three separate compartments, with a perforated baffle separating the forward and middle compartments. Upon release from the delivery aircraft, fuze arming occurs.

The fuse detonates Composition B burster charges, splitting the bomb body and dispersing the chemical agent in the form of an aerosol vapor over the target.

The bombs are stored in MK 398 shipping and storage containers which serve as the over-pack in the event of leakage. The container weighs 327 pounds and is 20 inches wide, 22 inches high and 103 inches long. The combined gross weight of a filled bomb in the container is 851 pounds. The container is a steel cylindrical shell with the top half secured by 18 latching bolts and is surrounded by a rectangular frame. The container has sample ports at each end, which are used to monitor the interiors of the containers. This monitoring permits detection of leaking bombs before the container is opened.

The bombs were filled in 1969 and placed in storage at Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA). Of the original 901 bombs, 13 were destroyed at RMA and the remaining 888 were shipped to DCD in 1981, of which 2 have been destroyed at the demil facility (TOCDF). The items are stored in seven, 80 foot long earth-covered igloos, each capable of housing 142 bombs. All explosive components are stored separately. All the containers will be monitored during a time limit not to exceed 120 hours prior to transport to the demil facility (TOCDF).

There are pictures showing:

- Internal view of the 3 compartments, the forward compartments being separated by the perforated baffle and the rear compartment.
- Burster tube that runs the length of it and opens at either end.
- The bomb itself, components of the tail fin assembly, the suspension assembly, conduit and counter weight assembly.
- Sampling detection plugs at each end and on the top half of the container.
- Additional photographs.

Question: Where did the nomenclature "Weteye" come from?

Answer: In the early '60s the Navy started producing these items. The "eye" comes from a nose guided system that had a camera. The rest of the bombs did not have a camera in the nose. The "wet" part indicates the filler, in this instance the liquid agent.

Question: Two of these have already been destroyed. Can you elaborate on those?
Were they destroyed in the furnaces?

Answer: They were, but Tom will comment on that.

Question: Were the two that were destroyed permitted for destruction?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Do you know where these bombs were filled and do you have the sampling information on them?

Answer: They were filled at Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Tom will address the analytical sampling of them.

GB WETEYE MOVEMENT - Deborah Ames

(Attachment 5)

In 1977 all GB bombs at Rocky Mountain Arsenal were neutralized except 900 Weteyes. Early that same year, the decision was made to move the Weteyes to DCD (previously TEAD).

Planning

In May, a draft Environmental Impact Statement was filed and it included a transportation plan. The plan was to fly the bombs from Stapleton Airport to Michael Army Airfield at Dugway and then ground convoy them from Dugway to DCD. The window for the movement was mid June to mid October 1977, due to hunting season and winter weather.

Politics

Colorado wanted the bombs either moved or destroyed. Utah did not want them moved to the State and DOD did not want them destroyed.

Timing

In the Spring of 1978, RMA discovered three leaking bombs, which provided more controversy. In October, six more leakers were discovered. In May 1979, Governor Matheson filed a suit to stop the movement. A month later (June 1979) the movement was postponed indefinitely due to the filing of the suit by Governor Matheson.

Then in February 1980, a decision was made to upgrade the facilities at RMA and store the bombs there. It was later opposed by Colorado. By October 1980, legislation was proposed by Gary Hart and approved, to move the bombs within one year. On January 16, 1981, a final decision was made to move the bombs to Tooele, with the actual movement being made in August of that year.

What Did We Get?

DCD received 888 Weteye bombs, 36 inert bombs and 3 GB fill ton containers from leaking Weteyes tha RMA had put into ton containers (and destroyed the casings).

Treatment Issues

When the leakers were put into ton containers sampling was done and in a report issued, Mercury was found to be very high. Due to Aluminum's melting point, the Army was concerned about the reaction in the furnaces when they burned the it with the GB.

Question: How many leakers have they had since they were moved to Utah?

Answer: None.

Question: I am interested in the ones they emptied into the ton containers and found Mercury. We have talked previously that no one seemed to know where the Mercury came from and someone's theory said it was from things previously stored in the ton containers, but now we have evidence that GB itself has Mercury in it, that was taken out of the Weteyes. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Answer: In the reports we received two of the Weteyes were sampled and they found minimal amounts of metal. In the report Colorado had, they thought it was reported in the wrong units (parts per/million instead of parts per/billion). Since it cannot be proven and the analytical methods used then don't allow a trace back, it is left for DCD to sample them.

WETEYE BOMB PROCESSING - Tom Kurkijy (Attachment 6)

There are 888 Weteye bombs in the stockpile, divided between 6 agent lots. We developed an analysis sampling plan and submitted it to DSHW for approval. We now have an approved analysis sampling plan for the Weteye bomb. There are 30 bombs that will be sampled and that was based on EPA's SW846, an analytical and sampling method document. The agent is being analyzed for HRA metals, the agent concentration and the agent breakdown products. The sampling analysis plan requires the analytical results for each lot will be reviewed by DSHW prior to processing. This is a difficult sampling exercise, because we must bring the bombs into the facility, drill holes in the bombs, then plug those holes and keep them stored inside the toxic area during the period of sampling. Close coordination with the Depot is being done when we bring the bombs in to be sampled and the processing of the lot. The first lot had two bombs that required sampling. There were 47 bombs in that lot. The metals in the agent was very low. It was less than what we previously demonstrated in both the LICS and the MPF furnace. The highest metal was aluminum at about 30 parts per/million.

Aluminum/GB Reaction Potential

It has been documented that Aluminum in high temperatures with water can create a very explosive reaction between the two. There was concern that same potential could exist with GB, even though there is no documentation about organics acting the same way as the aluminum with water. We went through an evaluation and GB volatilizes between 316E and 460E F. The aluminum alloy that makes up the Weteye bomb melts at 1060E. The concern was the aluminum would melt before all of the GB had volatilized and the hot aluminum would then fall into the liquid agent. What was the risk of a explosive reaction? We did some modeling through a sub-contractor. He demonstrated that if we operated the furnace a 1275E all the GB would volatilize prior to the aluminum actually melting. We had to prove out the model, so we did systemization testing using a simulant material with similar properties to GB.

Weteye Bomb Systemization

The simulant used for the model was a substance called Dowanol and is used as a heat transfer fluid and has similar properties to GB. We put in a weteye bomb and scaled it up. We started with the equivalent of 1% GB heel based on a BTU value and stepped it up to the maximum that we can process, which is a 5% heel in the bomb.

Operating the MPF at 1275E F, all the Dowanol volatilized prior to the aluminum starting to melt. A camera was placed to observe the bomb in the furnace so the Dowanol could be observed burning and it flamed out before the aluminum began melting. Even with the demonstration, 2 holes were punched and all the agent drained out. In the case of the Weteye bombs, 3 holes were punched and agent drained out to less than 5% heel. The bomb and shipping container were dilled to allow heel to drain out and into the cradle. Again it was successfully demonstrated that simulant at this point would be completely volatilized before the aluminum would melt.

MPF Operating Parameters for Bomb Processing

This drill system required a class one Permit Modification Request and also a Facility Construction Certification (FCC) Report for the Weteye drill. They were approved by DSHW. The operating parameter for the MPF was set at 1275E F. The permitted temperature range for the MPF is 1200E F to 1700E F, so there was no requirement to do any additional permit modifications to support the lower operating temperature. In addition, the water sprays in the furnace were locked out and will not be used, because of the potential reaction with the aluminum.

Current Status

The first two bombs that were previously sampled and located in the plant were successfully processed on September 14-15. They both drained to less than a 5% heel and the drill system worked as designed. The two bombs were processed through the furnace and the test camera showed the GB volatilized prior to the aluminum melting, as the simulant had previously demonstrated.

The plant is on hold for any additional deliveries during the current situation.

Question: In the sampling initially you talked about drilling the aluminum casing and then you eventually drilled all the way through. You don't have any problems at all with filings?

Answer: No we haven't. We have to make sure the entrants are aware there will be filings because we don't want a suit tear if they are in the area. As they go in to do maintenance, we want them to know filings could be there. When the bomb comes out of the furnace, it's basically a blob in the bottom of the tray; it's totally melted. The drill that is set up for the drilling is an auger type bit, that doesn't create the filings, as you would think.

Question: What was the actual concentration of merc in the burn that you found?

Answer: I think it was 0.02 parts per/million and 0.09 on the two bombs.

Question: If I remember correctly, some of the language in the permit actually allows you to go above a 5% heel on a Weteye bomb. What measures would be taken to make sure there wouldn't be a reaction?

Answer: The 75 pounds is a 5% heel on a ton container. It applies to bulk munition containers and that's if we cannot drain down to a 5% level, but we haven't encountered that and don't expect to. We make entries to ensure we have adequate drains and continue to try to drain the munitions before we process them. It requires us to notify the State prior to attempting to do that, plus we would have to reevaluate based on the concerns of "will it volatilize"? There would be a lot of work that must be done before we could process a bomb with greater than a 5% heel. At this point we don't believe that, but we have only sampled two and processed two so it's premature to say we won't, but it's based on what we have seen so far.

Question: If you do run into this, where you did with the MC1 bomb, is it safe to say you absolutely will not, absolutely under any circumstances, process that until other demonstrations have been done?

Answer: The MC1 bomb incident was the result of a problem with equipment, not with drainability of the bomb. The bomb was drainable to less than a 5% heel, but there was a problem with the mechanical equipment. We have taken measures to ensure that won't happen with any bulk munitions. We will not process a bomb with greater than 5% heel, because of the concern with the potential of the GB in the bomb not volatilizing prior to the aluminum melting. We would have to go through another risk evaluation prior to us processing that and be in discussions with the State.

Suzanne requested, with the approval of the Commission, the suspension of the rest of the Agenda, with the exception of Item 11 and address each item then at the next meeting. It was so moved and seconded. The Commission so agreed.

ELECTION OF CHAIR - Suzanne Winters

Suzanne told the Commission her office had been moved from the Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, down to the Department of Community and Economic Development. This is in order to facilitate more closely working with some of the Governor's initiatives on focusing on science and technology development, transferring to the private sector and training of the workforce. Because of that she was asked to divest herself from working on the Commission or chairing the Commission, along with other military duties she has worked with. In discussions with Environmental Quality as well as the military, she proposed the Commission elect a new Chair. Suzanne then nominated Deborah Kim. She stated that Deborah had excellent experience and organization skills and is very familiar with the program, as well as the Emergency Response side. Suzanne then asked for a second and Dave Ostler seconded the nomination and the vote was unanimous. Deborah Kim became the new Chairperson for the Citizen's Advisory Commission.

The date for the next CAC meeting will be on November 15th at 6:30 p.m. in Tooele. Suzanne then asked for a motion to adjourn and it was so moved.

The meeting adjourned at 8:30 p.m.